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Out of business?
Aveek Bhattacharya
The rise (and fall?) of public service marketisation
For around 30 years, from the early 1980s to the early 2010s, themarketisation of public services was perhaps the most prominent andsignificant domestic policy trend in British politics.1 It began with the
Thatcher and Major governments’ privatisations and tentative steps towards quasi-
markets for health and education. It continued through New Labour’s public
service reforms. And it dominated the early legislation of theCoalition government.
Yet, in the past seven years or so, the marketisation agenda has dropped
from view, fragmented, and in some cases gone into reverse. In this article,
I describe the rise and fall of marketisation. I consider a few possible
explanations as to why the apparently inexorable momentum of
marketisation appears to have stalled. Ultimately, I suggest that for all its
waning political salience, marketisation raises important questions for how
progressives believe public services should be delivered.
WHAT IS MARKETISATION?
Marketisation, as I am using the term here, has two elements, captured in
each half of the pithy phrase ‘choice and competition’. On the demand
side, users of public services are permitted, assisted and encouraged to
behave more like consumers in the marketplace: to shop around, to
compare and to choose. On the supply side, providers of public services are
liberated, facilitated or required to behave like firms in the marketplace: to
innovate, to grow and to compete.
Proponents of marketisation believe it brings three types of benefits:2
1 Or, more accurately, English politics – the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales
have generally resisted marketisation in their education and health systems
2 Le Grand J (2007) The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering public services through choice and compe-
tition, Princeton University Press
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• First, it is supposed to improve public services. Providers have stronger
incentives to perform well, and the more efficient and responsive among
them thrive, while less effective ones wither away.
• Second, it is supposed to improve the equity of the system.
Disadvantaged families have more to gain from improvement.
Meanwhile, the sharp-elbowed middle classes are prevented from queue
jumping or gaming the system – for example, by moving to be near a
better school.
• Third, marketisation is supposed to bring empowerment: newly minted
consumers become sovereigns with greater control over their own lives,
as opposed to pawns at the mercy of bureaucratic public sector
monopolies.
THE RISE OF MARKETISATION, 1979–2013
Marketisation typically means a greater role for private providers, expected
to be better incentivised and culturally suited to behave competitively. In
energy, rail and telecommunications, marketisation is closely associated
with the privatisation of state-run services in the 1980s and 1990s. New
Labour opened up the NHS to “any willing provider” and now around
8 per cent of publicly funded health spending goes to the private sector.3
Labour also created academies – schools funded by the state but
independently run – which now teach 75 per cent of state secondary
students.4
Significantly, privatisation brought the break-up of monopolies. British
Telecom (BT), British Gas and regional electricity companies were exposed
to competitive retail markets. Where consumer choice was not deemed
possible, competition was introduced through forms of tendering.
Following the privatisation of British Rail in 1994, train-operating
companies battle for government franchises to run particular routes. Local
authorities competitively outsource a range of services. The ‘purchaser–
provider’ split – introduced to the NHS by the Conservative government
of the 1990s – created an internal market, where NHS trusts providing
3 The figure is 22 per cent if we include GPs, dentists, pharmacists and opticians, which are not
NHS trusts or statutory bodies, but which are widely regarded as “being within the health ser-
vice”. Buckingham H and Dayan M (2019) ‘Privatisation in the English NHS: fact or fiction?’,
Nuffield Trust blog, 15 November 2019. https://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/news-item/
privatisation-in-the-english-nhs-fact-or-fiction
4 Department for Education (2019) ‘Statistics: school and pupil numbers’. https://www.gov.uk/
government/collections/statistics-school-and-pupil-numbers
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healthcare sell their services to health authorities and GPs with cash
budgets to spend on behalf of their patients.
“Marketisation typically means a greater role
for private providers, expected to be better
incentivised and culturally suited to behave
competitively”
Choice was increasingly devolved to the users of public services themselves. The
Education Reform Acts of 1981 and 1988 enshrined the parental right to
choose a school for their child. Expanding patient choice was a central objective
of the Labour government through the 2000s,5 and was an important element
of Andrew Lansley’s 2012 NHS reforms.6 As a result, patients are supposed to
be able to decide who does their elective procedure, which GP to register with,
which mental health service to use and where to give birth.
An enduring difficulty for the marketisation agenda has been the failure of
certain providers to compete and of certain consumers to use their choice
effectively. The NHS internal market has been described as creating
“monogamy rather than polygamy”, with commissioners tending to stick
with their local NHS providers.7 In response, the Lansley reforms
prohibited commissioners from engaging in anti-competitive behaviour,
and the role of the NHS regulator Monitor was expanded to include
“promoting competition, where appropriate”.8 Energy companies
consolidated into a ‘big six’, and so the Coalition government took
measures to encourage new entrants to the market.9
5 Department of Health and Social Care (2015) Policy Paper: 2010 to 2015 government policy:
Choice in health and social care; Turner D and Powell T (2016) NHS Commissioning before April
2013, briefing paper number CBP 05607, House of Commons Library




7 Turner D and Powell T (2016) NHS Commissioning before April 2013, briefing paper number
CBP 05607, House of Commons Library, p 21
8 Ham C, Baird B, Gregory S, Jabbal J and Alderwick H (2015) The NHS under the Coalition
Government: Part one: NHS reform, The King’s Fund, p 48
9 Davey E (2014) ‘Coalition energy market reforms will bring cheaper power to the people’, The
Guardian, 12 January 2014,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/12/coalition-energy-market-reforms-
cheaper-power; Ofgem (2014) ‘Ofgem breaks down barriers so competition can work better for
energy consumers’, press release, 26 February 2014,
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/ofgem-breaks-down-barriers-so-
competition-can-work-better-energy-consumers
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“An enduring difficulty for the marketisation
agenda has been the failure of certain
providers to compete and of certain consumers
to use their choice effectively”
A persistent concern for education policymakers through the 2000s was a
perceived lack of engagement with the school choice process, particularly
among disadvantaged parents.10 The government responded with a range
of measures to make choice easier. League tables have become ever-more
refined to help parents compare schools. The application process has been
standardised across local authorities. Free transport to school has been
expanded to allow low-income households access to more schools. Labour
even created a network of choice advisers to support parents.11 Similar
issues emerged in the energy market: the regulator Ofgem’s 2011 Retail
Market Review found that 60 per cent of consumers had never switched
provider, and that non-switchers were disproportionately likely to come
from lower social grades.12 To draw them to participate in the market, the
Coalition government placed requirements on energy companies to
simplify and reduce the number of tariffs they offer consumers.13
DECLINE AND FRAGMENTATION: 2013 ONWARDS
For the first half of its term in government, the Coalition was as
committed to marketisation as any of its predecessors. Among its first
pieces of legislation was the Academies Act, paving the way for all schools
to convert to academies. Soon after, it raised the cap on tuition fees in an
effort to get universities to compete for students on price. The Lansley
reforms were introduced in the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Energy
Secretary Ed Davey worked closely with Ofgem to promote energy market
competition.
Yet somewhere in the middle of the 2010–15 government, the
marketisation agenda began to fragment and fall away. Its profile declined,
10 Stiell B, Shipton L, Coldron J and Coldwell M (2008) Choice Advice: An evaluation, Depart-
ment for Children, Schools and Families, p 7
11 Sims S (2012) The Development of Quasi-markets in Secondary Education, Institute for
Government
12 Ofgem (2011) The Retail Market Review: Findings and initial proposals
13 BBC News (2012) ‘Ed Davey announces “four core tariff” plan’, BBC News website,
20 November 2012. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20404659
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and ‘choice and competition’ lost its place on the centre stage of political
debate. Moreover, in some policy areas, the onward push of marketisation
faced serious challenge and lost ground for the first time in about 30 years.
“Yet somewhere in the middle of the 2010–15
government, the marketisation agenda began
to fragment and fall away”
The replacement of Andrew Lansley as Health Secretary with Jeremy Hunt
in 2012 signalled a clear shift in policy, with Hunt “rarely mentioning
competition” and showing less interest in structural reforms.14 The 2017
Conservative manifesto vowed “to review the operation of the [NHS]
internal market, which can fail to act in the interests of patients and creates
costly bureaucracy”.15 Instead, it proposed “integration of care”, a central
theme of the 2019 NHS Long Term Plan16 – partnerships of hospitals,
clinical commissioning groups, councils and charities, working together
rather than competing with one another.17
The government’s approach to the energy market shifted, too. Whereas
Coalition policy had valorised footloose switchers and encouraged
consumers to join their ranks, Theresa May put herself on the side of those
who failed to participate in the market, condemning an energy market that
“punishes loyalty with higher prices”.18 These non-switchers are supposed
to be protected with a cap on their energy prices. That mirrored a shift in
the opposition Labour party. Under Ed Miliband, Labour had proposed a
price cap, but as a temporary measure en route to a more competitive
market.19 By 2017, Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour was calling for energy
14 Ham C, Baird B, Gregory S, Jabbal J and Alderwick H (2015) The NHS under the Coalition
Government: Part one: NHS reform, The King’s Fund, p 5
15 Conservative and Unionist Party (2017) Forward, Together: Our plan for a stronger Britain and
a prosperous future, p 67
16 NHS (2019) The NHS Long Term Plan. https://www.longtermplan.nhs.uk/publication/nhs-
long-term-plan/
17 Triggle N (2019) ‘Are Andrew Lansley’s NHS reforms being binned?’, BBC News website,
11 January 2019.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-46827981
18 Milligan B (2017) ‘Theresa May revives plan to cap energy prices’, BBC News website,
4 October 2017.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-41499483
19 Flint C (2013) ‘Energy bills – we’ll freeze them’. http://www.carolineflint.org/energybills
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companies to be nationalised in recognition of the fact that “people don’t
have time to shop around”.20
Rail marketisation is also under threat. In the last couple of years, the East
Coast Mainline and Northern Rail franchises have been taken into public
hands,21 and there are some suggestions South Western Railway may
follow.22 The government is currently reviewing the very franchise model,23
although it is unlikely to go anywhere near as far as the Labour party and
endorse an end to marketisation and a return to state-run monopoly.24
Local authorities have begun to turn away from marketisation, with
‘insourcing’ (bringing contracts back in-house to be delivered by the
authority) on the rise.25
But marketisation is not on the retreat everywhere. There is little serious
discussion of rolling back the privatisation of British Airways and BT
(although Labour did propose the nationalisation of BT’s broadband
network, Openreach26). Meanwhile, recent schools policy debate has been
dominated by questions of funding rather than institutional reform.27
The only area where marketisation has advanced, rather than merely
maintaining a holding pattern, is university education. As with school
20 Labour Party (2017) For the Many Not the Few, p 20




22 Powley T (2020) ‘South Western Railway under threat of renationalisation’, Financial Times,
7 January 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/713e4ef6-3193-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de
23 Butcher L (2019) ‘The Williams Review: the future of rail?’, House of Commons Library
insight, 25 October 2019.
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/insights/the-williams-review-the-future-of-rail/
24 Reuters (2019) ‘Factbox: nationalisation in the UK – Labour’s plans for companies’, Reuters
website, 21 November 2019.
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-election-labour-companies-fac/factbox-nationalisation-
in-the-uk-labours-plans-for-companies-idUKKBN1XV1AL
25 Baines M (2019) Rebuilding Capacity: The case for insourcing public contracts, Association for
Public Service Excellence
26 Sweney M and Collinson P (2019) ‘How feasible is Labour’s free broadband plan and part-
nationalisation of BT?’, The Guardian, 15 November 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2019/nov/15/how-feasible-is-labour-free-broadband-
plan-and-part-nationalisation-of-bt
27 Andrews J, Hunt E, Mills B and Bunting F (2019) General Election 2019: An analysis of mani-
festo plans for education, Education Policy Institute
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league tables, the government has sought to facilitate comparison of
universities through standardised metrics,28 such as the Teaching
Excellence Framework29 and published earnings data.30 The Office for
Students, established in 2018 to regulate higher education, exists to
“promote competition and choice for students”.31
WHAT HAS CHANGED?
What happened in the 2010s to check the progress of marketisation? To
some extent, marketisation was overtaken by events. Certainly, since 2016,
political will and attention have been displaced by Brexit. High-profile
outsourcing failures, such as the collapse of Carillion,32 the botched
privatisation of probation services33 and G4S pulling out of its security
contract for the London 2012 Olympics34 have also undermined support
for marketisation.
Perhaps more significant, though, have been shifts in ideology and
personnel at the top of government. David Cameron lacked as clear a
governing philosophy than Thatcher, Blair or even Major. As a result,
the continuation of marketisation policies in the early Coalition years
was primarily due to the energy and initiative of specific ministers –
Lansley for health, Gove for schools, Davey for energy – sometimes
even without Cameron’s full awareness.35 The May and Johnson
28 Office for Students, ‘Discover Uni and Unistats’, Office for Students website.
https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/advice-and-guidance/student-information-and-data/
discover-uni-and-unistats/




30 Fazackerley A (2020) ‘Alarm at Ofsted-style plan to rank universities by graduate earnings’, The
Guardian, 11 February 2020.
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2020/feb/11/alarm-at-ofsted-style-plan-to-rank-
universities-by-graduate-earnings
31 Office for Students, ‘What we will do’, Office for Students website.
https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/about/our-strategy/what-we-will-do/
32 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (2018) After Carillion: Public sec-
tor outsourcing and contracting: Seventh report of session 2017–19, House of Commons Library
33 Sasse T (2019) ‘Probation outsourcing is a case study in failure’, Institute for Government blog,
16 May 2019. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/probation-outsourcing-case-
study-failure
34 BBC News (2012) ‘G4S Olympic failure prompts ministers to “think again” over outsourcing’,
BBC News website, 14 August 2012.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19251772
35 Kirkup J (2019) ‘The man who wasn’t there’, The Critic, November.
https://thecritic.co.uk/issues/november-2019/the-man-who-wasnt-there/
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administrations, in part responding to a more full-throatedly anti-
market Labour party, have been more open to rejecting marketisation
when politically expedient.
“The May and Johnson administrations, in part
responding to a more full-throatedly anti-
market Labour party, have been more open to
rejecting marketisation when politically
expedient”
DOES THIS MATTER?
It would take an entire book to wade through all the evidence on whether
marketisation has been effective in each of the different domains in which
it has been tried. In one line: although experiences vary, as does the quality
of existing studies, gains in efficiency and quality have often been modest
and less likely to accrue to disadvantaged groups.36
Proponents of marketisation will argue that this is because reform has not
gone far enough. The majority of clinical commissioning groups still limit
the number of providers they work with, rather than contracting with “any
qualified provider”.37 Less than 40 per cent of patients are offered a choice
of provider when referred for an outpatient procedure.38 School allocation
depends as much on where you live as which school you choose.39 Schools
remain relatively insulated from market pressure because ‘failing’ schools
36 Allen R (2007) ‘Allocating pupils to their nearest secondary school: the consequences for social
and ability stratification’, Urban Studies 44(4): 751–770; Allen R and Burgess S (2010) The
Future of Competition and Accountability in Education, 2020 Public Services Trust at the RSA;
Jilke S (2014) ‘Choice and equality: are vulnerable citizens worse off after liberalization
reforms?’, Public Administration 93(1): 68–85; Morse A (2016) Personalised Commissioning in
Adult Social Care, National Audit Office; Parker D (2004) ‘The UK’s privatisation experiment:
the passage of time permits a sober assessment’, working paper 1126, CESifo; Sasse T,
Guerin B, Nickson S, O’Brien M, Pope T and Davies N (2019) Government Outsourcing: What
has worked and what needs reform?, Institute for Government; The Health Foundation (2011)
Evidence Scan: Competition in Healthcare




38 Renaud-Komiya N (2014) ‘Minority of patients are offered choice of provider, say Monitor
and NHS England’, HSJ, 7 August 2014.
https://www.hsj.co.uk/news/acute-care/minority-of-patients-are-offered-choice-of-provider-say-
monitor-and-nhs-england/5073668.article
39 Burgess S, Greaves E and Vignoles A (2020) School Places: A fair choice?, The Sutton Trust
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rarely close, and it is difficult to get permission to open new ones.40 There
is still little head-to-head competition between train companies covering
the same lines.41 Smart meters and easier switching might encourage
consumers to engage more with the energy market.42 But with their
underlying theoretical model facing ever-greater scepticism, proponents will
need to remake their argument sector by sector to demonstrate that the
case for marketisation has stronger underpinnings than just dogmatic faith
in textbook microeconomics. They will also need to adjust to life on the
defensive, identifying and rectifying potential future Carillions that could
further discredit marketisation.
Opponents of marketisation may be scenting blood, with the opportunity
to bring utilities back into public hands and to create a more collaborative,
less competitive, health and education system. The challenge for them is to
come up with different responses to the fundamental questions that
marketisation raises and tries to answer. How can the government best
incentivise providers of public services and manage their performance?
How can it best improve the experience of public service users,
empowering those who want to be involved without burdening those who
do not? How can it minimise inequalities in the standards of services
people receive?
Indeed, there is an argument to say that there may be better ways to
address these ultimate questions than to relitigate old debates over
marketisation. Prior to the 2019 general election, expert groups such as the
Education Policy Institute43 and The King’s Fund44 advised parties to
avoid being distracted by sweeping structural reforms and to focus on more
modest, but better-evidenced, improvements. Given that, in many areas,
marketisation appears to have brought neither major benefits nor
40 Sahlgren GH (2013) Incentivising Excellence: School choice and education quality, Centre for
Market Reform of Education
41 The Economist (2019) ‘How rising rail fares and falling punctuality undermine confidence’, The
Economist, 15 August 2019.
https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/08/15/how-rising-rail-fares-and-falling-punctuality-
undermine-confidence
42 Financial Times (2017) ‘Britain’s energy market is faulty but not broken’, Financial Times,
24 April 2017.
https://www.ft.com/content/474d0ea4-28de-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c
43 Andrews J, Hunt E, Mills B and Bunting F (2019) General Election 2019: An analysis of mani-
festo plans for education, Education Policy Institute, p 55
44 Murray R (2019) ‘Politicians should avoid the temptation of another NHS top-down re-organi-
sation’, The King’s Fund blog, 14 October 2019.
https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/blog/2019/10/politicians-nhs-reorganisation
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substantial harm, it may well turn out to be that further institutional
tinkering is a waste of time, energy and political capital.
“Opponents of marketisation may be scenting
blood, with the opportunity to bring utilities
back into public hands and to create a more
collaborative, less competitive, health and
education system”
Markets are now embedded in our public services, but for the first time in
a generation, the political project of marketisation is at a crossroads. In
some areas, we might want to complete the job. In others, we might want
to turn back the clock. We might decide that radical reform is not worth
the bother, and that we should focus on alternative strategies for
improvement. The disintegration of marketisation’s hegemony should free
us to make these judgements on a case-by-case basis, using the best
available evidence as to whether markets have increased or diminished
quality, efficiency, equity and empowerment. Whichever way we go, we
should do it consciously and deliberately.
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